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What has been called "The New Atheism" is no longer new.  Victor J. Stenger reminds 
us of this in the beginning of his The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and 
Reason (2009).  Victor J. Stenger, the author of the New York Times bestseller "God: 
The Failed Hypothesis" (2007), takes time in his new work to "review and expand upon 
the principles of New Atheism", taking into account the many Christian responses to 
the New Atheism and showing that "their criticisms are misguided and their arguments 
easily countered" (14).  It was Victor J. Stenger who's "God: The Failed Hypothesis" 
argued that because there is no evidence, when it should be there, that it "is now 
sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the God worshipped by the Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims does not exist" (12).  In his recent book Stenger responds to 
those who have written against notable "New Atheists" like Richard Dawkins, Sam 
Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett, by theologians and Christian 
apologists including Dinesh D'Souza, Becky Garrison, John Haught, Alister and Janna 
Collicut McGrath, David Marshall, Francis Collins, and Thomas Crean.  These, 
according to Stenger, do nothing more than misrepresent and ignore key points in the 
New Atheist literature. 
 
The crux of Stengers (as well as others) argument for atheism, as well as his reasons for 
rejecting "moderate religion" is that if God were to exist and interact in the physical 
world then God, visa-vise his actions, should be testable, observable, and falsifiable.  
He disagrees with the National Academy of Sciences, Stephen Jay Gould's famous  
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"non-overlapping magisteria" (NOMA), and should disagree with the double causation 
of Thomism or the "two-worlds hypothesis" because it thinks of God and science as 
two completely separate enterprises, each of which has nothing to say of the other.  For 
Stenger science has more than enough to say to religion, especially to a God who 
supposedly interacts with the physical world.  Stenger, as well as other New Atheists, 
would fall under the "Conflict Thesis" proposed by Ian Barbour because they think of 
science and religion as holding conflicting claims about the world.  I would assume that 
Stenger would classify the "post-Conflict theologians" under the rubric of "moderate 
religion" that, according to him, does not come to terms with what science tells us 
about God. 
 
Stenger makes interesting use of his books format.  He speaks on a plethora of issues, 
sometimes just in passing and sometimes with lengthy retort, but taken together his 
work is a tour de force of the New Atheism.  Since his new work is only ten chapters I 
will summarize each chapter chronologically.  His first chapter deals with “Atheism on 
the Offensive”, namely, how the New Atheism rejects modern notions of religion being 
“beyond critique” simply because it deals with issues of sanctity, holiness, and most 
importantly, a sovereign God who deserves to be worshipped.  Daniel Dennett's 
position on how we ought to study religion scientifically breaks this taboo.  This 
chapter shows how the New Atheism, over the past six years of literature, has 
contributed to what Dennett calls “breaking the spell.”  Stenger begins by 
chronologically listing what he considers to be the most important of the literature: Sam 
Harris' The End of Faith (2004), Richard Dawkin's The God Delusion (2006), Daniel C. 
Dennett's Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon  (2006), his own God: 
A Failed Hypothesis (2007), and Christopher Hitchen's God is Not Great: How 
Religion Poisons Everything (2007).  He uses these authors to expand upon and create a 
picture of what might curiously be called the tradition of the New Atheism.   
 
Stenger's second chapter is about “The Folly of Faith.”  He notes how America treats 
faith with a certain respect and approval, unwilling to see its folly.  “Faith”, according 
to Stenger, “should not be exonerated, should not be treated with respect, but rather 
disputed” (46).  He continues through this chapter to show how damaging religious 
faith can be to society.  He notes how faith was used in the delineations of the Bush 
administration, the popular Evangelical response which said that 9/11 was God's 
punishment, the neocons and theocons of the Religious Right, the apocalyptic and anti-
worldly sentiments of Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins and their famous Left Behind 
series, and many other examples.  These empirical examples of the folly of faith are 
only secondary to the epistemic examples of folly.  Stenger wonders how, when 
religious persons are asked to provide evidence for their beliefs, they stumble to find 
any.  They may attempt to provide evidence by pointing to the empty tomb, the death of 
the early Christians, Josephus, and the New Testament text as examples, but Stenger 
considers these unjustifiable.  The empty tomb can be easily debated, the death of early 
Christians does not say much, Josephus' supposed sections about Jesus have been 
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debunked as 4th century interpolations, and the texts of the New Testament only shows 
that they were copied and transmitted repeatedly.  None of these examples give us 
evidence to believe in God or Jesus.  Not to mention the work of theologians like Søren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Albert Schweitzer, Rudolf Bultmann, and 
others who did not think that evidence was as important as existential concern, faith, 
and hope.  I am sure Stenger would critique these theologians as well, for not basing 
their beliefs on evidence, but suffice it to say these theologians radically shifted debates 
over evidence during their time.  But here we are, back at it again.  And since no 
evidence has been provided it should point to the absence of what should have 
evidence; or as Stenger puts it: “Absence of evidence is evidence of absence when the 
evidence should be there and is not” (58). 
 
In chapter three we see how Stenger deals with science and religion, as he wields what 
he calls “The Sword of Science.”  He takes to answering those who think of science as 
pretentious, arrogant, and based on as much faith as religion.  He notes Paul Davies 
piece in the New York Times 2007 “Science has its own faith-based belief system” and 
says in response: “our [the New Atheists] confidence in science is based on its practical 
success, not some logical deduction derived from dubious metaphysical assumptions” 
(71).  The “faith” that atheists are accused of having is faith that the universe is rational, 
or at least ordered in some way.  But Stenger thinks that “it's not the world that is or 
isn't rational.  It's human beings” (71).  Science, for Stenger, “simply applies rational 
methods in taking and analyzing data, following certain rules to ensure their data are as 
free from error as possible” (71).  To Stenger and many others science is simply a 
method, not a metaphysic.  The second half of the chapter is about attempts to reconcile 
science and religious faith.  He notes the attempts made by John Templeton, Stephen 
Jay Gould, and Jerry Coyne.  More recently Stenger mentions the efforts of those at the 
Vatican (from which I assume the 20 year venture of the VO/CTNS series on divine 
action, on which I have written) who “address the question of God's action in the 
universe” and suggest, “quantum mechanics and chaos theory provide possible 
mechanisms” (83).  He refers to his other recent book Quantum Gods: Creation, Chaos, 
and the Search for Cosmic Consciousness (2009) and says simply that the problem with 
these pursuits is that they “still require a God to violate the laws of physics when he 
steps in to change the motion of bodies” (83).   
 
Chapter four, “The Design Delusion”, surveys the arguments and literature centered on 
the issue of “design” in and of the universe.  He notes the two main ways that 
theologians have argued about design: the first is the fine-tuning of the universe and the 
second is about the design apparent in living beings.  He argues that both of these are 
refutable.  The refutations for the former of the arguments (the fine-tuning argument) 
has four key points: 1) “we cannot know that more than one set of parameters is 
possible” 2) “we have no way of knowing that a huge range of parameters is possible or 
anything about the distribution of those parameters so that any given set is unlikely by 
chance” 3) “we have no way of knowing what sets of parameters might still lead to 
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some form of life different from ours” and 4) “we have no reason to assume there aren't 
many universes” (89).  From here Stenger goes into more detail fitting to his academic 
interests in physics and astronomy.  He covers the ratio of electrons to protons, the ratio 
of electromagnetic force to gravity, the expansion rate of the universe, the mass density 
of the universe, and the cosmological constant.  If not taken too far back after all this, 
Stenger proceeds to challenge the later argument from design, the design apparent in 
living beings.  Stenger argues, along with Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, that 
“complex biological systems can evolve from simpler ones by means of natural 
selection” (98).   Stenger also notes how he thinks evolution has not gone far enough in 
the modern religious consciousness.  He argues that Pope John Paul II did not go far 
enough when he said that “evolution is more than a hypothesis” since the Pope noted 
that there are several different competing theories about evolution, which Stenger says 
is “hardly the position of today's evolutionists” (99).   
 
In his fifth chapter, “Holy Smoke”, Stenger takes issue with the violence and social 
atrocities committed in the name of religious belief.  He says that today most of these 
acts occur in radical Islam but that their roots are found “in the early pages of the 
Bible” (108).  Stenger notes that the God of the Old Testament, YHWH, demands the 
killing of those who do not worship him (Exodus 12: 29-30, Deuteronomy 13:6-11, 1 
Samuel 6:19, 1 Chronicles 21:14, etc.).  Stenger also points out the problems with the 
sayings of Jesus.  Jesus, as it seems from some passages of the New Testament, 
encouraged the beating of slaves (Luke 12:47-48), never spoke on poverty, compares 
himself to the LORD (YHWH) of Old Testament, and thinks of himself as coming to 
bring judgment to the world at the eschaton (Matthew 13:41-42).  Even moderate 
religious believers, ones who may not interpret these passages literally, or believe them 
too strongly, “feed the extremism of others” (111).  Stenger then recalls the “historical 
horrors” of religion: the Crusades, the Inquisitions, the thirty years war, acts of Islamic 
extremism, the Mountain Meadows Massacre, and many others.  These make one 
question the existence and impact that religious beliefs have had and continue to have 
in contemporary society.  Along with other New Atheist's Stenger thinks that religious 
belief is the direct and sufficient cause for the evil committed by religious persons.  It is 
not so much their political, economic, or social status, but their personal religious 
beliefs that cause atrocities.  Bertrand Russell, whose outstanding skepticism about 
religion is obvious, said “religion prevents us from removing the fundamental causes of 
war,” even if religion is not the cause in and of itself. 
 
In chapter six Stenger deals with issues relating to suffering and morality, and argues 
for a completely naturalistic approach to them.  He goes through certain passages of the 
Old Testament, specifically from the Prophets, were God punished his people for their 
sins (Amos 3, Hosea 13) and quotes from the biblical scholar Bart Ehrman who notes 
that “this is not the kind, loving, caring God of nursery rhymes and Sunday school 
booklets.  God is a fierce animal who will rip his people to shreds for failing to worship 
him” (138).  Stenger then examines the typical religious answers to suffering and 
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morality: the free will defense, redemptive suffering, eschatological justifications, and 
others.  He also looks at how suffering is dealt with in Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Taoism.  From this Stenger challenges the view that sources morality in religion.  The 
problem is that “scientific facts--objective observations of human behavior—as well as 
logical analysis tell a different story” (150).  This story is that of people killing for their 
particular religion, or God.  The Christian story is one where a supposedly good God 
allows, and at worst controls, the suffering and evil experienced by humanity.  But as 
Plato points out “either God defines what is good, in which case it is arbitrary, or God 
is inherently good, in which case goodness is defined independent of God” (150).  
Similarly, we must decide which God we are talking about.  Is it the Christian, Muslim, 
or Jewish God that sources morality?  Stenger notes this as a problem since “there are 
no moral principles that are shared by all religious people, independent of their 
affiliation, that are not also shared by atheists and agnostics” (150).  Stenger, as well as 
most atheists and agnostics, find morality sourced in humanity.  It can be traced 
biologically to evolution and natural selection, and socially, to group behavior and 
group interest.   
 
In chapter seven, “The Nature of Nature”, Stenger elaborates on matter, the laws of 
nature, and the immaterial “spirit” many assume to be working behind the scenes of the 
universe.  He begins by sorting through issues relating to naturalism and scientific 
materialism.  To those who reject either because they cannot rule out a supernatural 
cause, Stenger says that “science does not have its mind closed to the 
supernatural…Science has looked and simply sees no evidence for anything beyond 
nature” (161).  Stenger does not think of scientific materialism as absolute or 
necessarily true, since it is “provisional.”  But just because it is provisional does not 
mean that it is wrong; materialism is “based on our best current knowledge” (161).  
This does not sound like the dogmatic “scientism” which many accuse the New 
Atheist’s of holding.  From here Stenger expounds upon the nature of matter and its 
movements.  He then notes the differences between matter and spirit: “matter does not 
perform miracles; spirit does.  If we ever saw a miracle, then that would be evidence for 
spirit.  So far we have not” (166).  Some wonder whether or not something “spiritual” 
occurred at the origin of the universe, namely, whether God created the world “at the 
beginning” or whether the universe always existed.  Stenger notes Dinesh D’Souza, 
Ravi Zacharias, and Peter Kreeft as examples of theists who think that Big Bang 
cosmology shows there was a creation of the world, space, and time.  Stenger speaks of 
how Christian apologists have used Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose’s 1970 paper 
to argue for a “singularity” at the beginning of the universe.  But, Stenger shows how 
both Hawking and Penrose rejected this notion because it did not take into account 
quantum mechanical explanations.    
 
In chapter eight Stenger talks about “The Nature of Mind.”   Stenger speaks on the 
many ways in which the concept of “mind” has been equated with “soul” or “spirit.”  
He contrasts these views with naturalism, saying that “according to naturalism there is 
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no immaterial soul, and mind is the product of matter and nothing more” (179).  
Naturalism, for Stenger, can provide a more than adequate explanation for what some 
call “religious experiences.”  Stenger compares the soul with other psychological 
folklore like psychic experiences, near-death experiences, and out-of-body experiences, 
all of which have dubious reports in the scientific community.  For Stenger this shows 
evidence not to believe, especially since “the soul looks just like it should look if it does 
not exist” (183).  On the theistic side of things, Stenger discusses how some believers, 
like John Haught, Thomas Crean, Stewart Goetz, and Charles Taliaferro, use 
consciousness and cognition to argue against naturalism; to them naturalism ignores the 
subjective experience of individuals and the irreducible nature of the mind and mental 
causation.  To substance dualists like these Stenger asks: “How does this immaterial 
thing that carries no energy or momentum provide energy and momentum to particles 
in the brain?” (187).  Stenger thinks that even though our current scientific models of 
the subjective side of mental experience are not complete, it does not mean that they 
will always be or that we need something non-physical to close the explanatory gap.  
Actually, Stenger is “looking forward to living ling enough to see that final gap closed 
by matter alone” (197). 
 
In chapter nine Stenger examines “The Way of Nature” found throughout the world 
religions.  He uses Karen Armstrong’s The Great Transformation: The Beginning of 
Our Religious Traditions (2006), as well as Karl Jaspers’ notion of the axial age, to 
examine the historical uprising of the world’s great religious traditions.  He questions 
Armstrong’s usage of words like “spiritual” and “mystical,” cautiously opting for “the 
attitude that nothing supernatural need be involved” (202).  Stenger contrasts the 
“metaphysics or theology” that has been of central concern for Western religious 
traditions with the Eastern “compassionate life” where “morality [is] at the heart of 
their teaching” (203).  He then proceeds to analyze Hinduism, Judaism, Greek 
Philosophy, Buddhism, Confucius, and Lao Tzu, saying that these “are marked by the 
return to the self as the center of religious consciousness” (211).  He questions the 
efforts that seek to connect Eastern philosophy to quantum mechanics; efforts made by 
Fritjof Capra, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, and Deepak Chopra.  These and many others 
center on what Stenger calls quantum spirituality.  To those interested in this subject, as 
well as an atheistic response to it, Stenger invites to read his Quantum Gods: Creation, 
Chaos, and the Search for Cosmic Consciousness (2009).  He goes on to critique forms 
of religious practice that try to empty one of their reason and critical thinking.  He 
wisely notes that “it is hard to see how using less of our brains we can learn more about 
the universe” (220, italics his).  In contrast Stenger argues for an atheism that 
appreciates life, where a man “take[s] responsibility for his own morality” (221).  This 
atheism may be compatible with Eastern traditions if they are interpreted 
naturalistically.  We can use “the way of nature” as an alternative path to 
supernaturalism and spiritualism.   
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In his final chapter, “The Future of Atheism,” Stenger lays out the values and goals 
shared by atheists throughout the world.  He begins by addressing questions about a 
possible “god gene” saying that if it exists “it most likely would have been put there by 
evolution,” but that “more likely, it does not exist” (226).  Stenger makes the point that 
“if there were [a god gene], then there wouldn’t be over a billion nonbelievers in the 
world” (227).  Along similar lines Stenger traces the growth and reduction of various 
forms of religious practice, along with the staggering growth of secularism.  Many 
conservatives see this growth as a threat to peaceful society.  Stenger quotes from Pat 
Robertson, Ann Coulter, Bill O’Reilly, Keith Ward, and John D. Caputo showing how 
many think of atheism as harmful for society.  To this Stenger replies: “Any number of 
societies now exist where the majority has freely abandoned religion and God.  Far 
from being dens of iniquity, these societies are the happiest, safest, and most successful 
in the world” (233).  One wonders how anyone could equate religion with a moral, 
peaceful society.  Continuing on, Stenger highlights some recent atheistic literature that 
centers on “living without religion.”  In brief he mentions works by Eric Maisel, S.C. 
Hitchcock, and Ronald Aronson.  For philosophical contributions to atheism Stenger 
notes recent works by David Mills, Guy P. Harrison, David Ramsey Steele, Thomas W. 
Clark, Susan Jacoby, Austin Dacey, and Taner Edis.  In ending his book, Stenger 
revisits the works of New Atheism and argues for their place in the modern intellectual 
landscape.  He challenges those who only see this movement as “negative” because 
“for every negative we have an even greater positive.  Faith is absurd and dangerous 
and we look forward to the day, no matter how distant, when the human race finally 
abandons it” (244).                                                             
  
  
       
 
